In Quest of National Security by Zbigniew Brzeziński & * * & Marin J. Strmecki

Author:Zbigniew Brzeziński & * * & Marin J. Strmecki [Brzeziński, Zbigniew & *, * & Strmecki, Marin J.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Political Freedom, Security (National & International), Political Science
ISBN: 9780813305752
Google: s113AAAAMAAJ
Goodreads: 2477067
Publisher: Westview Press
Published: 1988-09-26T00:00:00+00:00

To answer these questions appropriately, we must answer the last question first. Only by determining what requirements would have to be met to manage a war effectively can we provide a meaningful answer to the question regarding the requirements of stable crisis bargaining. If we could not manage a war effectively or could not bargain stably, we would have either to preempt or concede in the event of a major crisis. Moreover, only if we have answered the questions regarding the requirements both of managing the war and of stable crisis bargaining can we meet the requirements for maintaining a sufficient and stable deterrent that preserves the peace and avoids conflict.

Bearing these difficult questions in mind, we must examine the likely strategic context of the next decade. Until recently, nuclear weapons were essentially blunt instruments of mass destruction. They could be used to inflict massive devastation, either through a sudden surprise attack or in a retaliatory response. In the 1950s, only the United States could inflict massive damage on the Soviet Union, though more recently each has the capability to destroy the other.

Yet, in recent years, the technological capabilities of nuclear weapons have altered this picture significantly: Nuclear weapons have now become instruments capable of being employed in a preemptive first strike designed not so much to destroy the opponent's society as a whole but to eliminate the opponent's strategic forces. The result of a successful first strike would be to render the victim defenseless. The aggressor could then compel his adversary to capitulate without precipitating a counterstrike that would result in mutual suicide.

Two developments have created this potential risk. The first is the revolution in the accuracy of intercontinental ballistic missiles. This is measured by what is called the "circular error probability," or CEP. The CEP of a missile is the radius within which warheads targeted at a certain point will actually land. Each new generation of missiles has had a smaller CEP. In other words, each generation of missiles has been far more accurate than its antecedent. The Soviet SS-19 has a CEP of 1,200 feet, and the SS-18, which is a newer missile, has one of 850 feet. The U.S. Minuteman III, which is our principal land-based ICBM, can land a warhead within 700 feet of its target; the MX can do so within 300 feet; and the medium-range Pershing II, with terminal guidance, within 100 feet. So the radius has shrunk from 1,200 feet to 100 feet.

These refinements represent a truly revolutionary development. One analyst has pointed out that in some ways it is more revolutionary than the transition from conventional to nuclear weapons because improving a missile's accuracy by a factor of 100 increases its effectiveness against hardened military targets about as much as multiplying the energy released a million times. Thus, modern nuclear weapons are becoming the means, not only for inflicting mass destruction, but also for striking precisely enough to disarm the opponent.

The other critical postwar development has been the massive and ongoing buildup of the Soviet strategic arsenal.

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